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Online Participation and the New Global Democracy:
Avaaz, a Case Study
LANKA HORSTINK
More than 20 years after the Earth Summit of 1992, which introduced important social
and ecological principles for policy-making and institutionalised participation, citizens
are still largely excluded from decision-making processes that affect them. The internet
was expected to change the balance of power in global politics. It has provided a platform
for the presentation of alternative discourses and facilitated the organisation of social
movements that clamour for a voice in global decision-making. The recent phenomenon
of digital mobilisation has enthused the media, politicians, scholars and internet users
alike. Could this be global democracy in the making? This article takes a critical look at
the current dynamics of online participation, in particular the recent trend of online
mass mobilisation, and will analyse the discourse, claims and practices of the web’s
largest movement, Avaaz, in an attempt to assess the democratic quality of an organis-
ation that insists it is “people-powered” and “member-driven”.
Introduction
While the rise of the internet has favoured the decentralisation of politics, offering
affordable mass communication and mobilisation tools to minorities, social move-
ments and even independent citizens, it has also brought the risk of populism,
false consensus and disinformation. Besides traditional NGOs, interest groups and
the aforementioned social movements, new andmore obscure groups have also dis-
covered the power and speed of internet politics. The objective of this article is to cri-
tically assess the democratic quality of online participation in what the author has
termed “digital mass politics”, by analysing the case of Avaaz, a non-proﬁt organis-
ation that sprung to fame by launching an online global petition site to inﬂuence
policy-making at national and international levels. Avaaz was founded in 2006 by
the leaders of Anglo-Saxon non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that were
already pioneering web-based advocacy (among them MoveOn and GetUp!). The
ﬁrst of these web platforms to go global, Avaaz quickly took the lead inmembership
and revenue size.Membership soared to approximately 42million in 2014,while rev-
enues for the sameyear totalledUS$19.36million,makingAvaaz themost resourceful
example of the “movement of public opinion”1 existing today.
1. Manuel Castells, “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and
Global Governance”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, No. 1
(2008), pp. 78–93.
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Avaaz and the organisations that helped found it can be considered hybrid
forms of transnational activism, combining characteristics of the traditional advo-
cacy organisations with those of second-generation network webs. The result is a
new type of organisation that Chadwick calls “hybrid mobilization movements”,2
sometimes behaving like an interest group, sometimes like a social movement, and
in the case of MoveOn, sometimes like the wing of a political party. Avaaz is closely
modelled on the MoveOn example, which Karpf describes as an “Internet-
mediated issue generalist”: organisations that have disruptively innovated political
advocacy by redeﬁning membership as linked to an online act (i.e. signing a peti-
tion) and revolutionising fundraising by pooling many small online donations in
timely and targeted appeals.3 Karpf describes MoveOn’s advocacy style as “head-
line chasing”—opportunistically appealing to action and/or donations according to
the popularity of events in the news—and what he calls “issue grazing”.4 He con-
cedes the undeniable success of these organisations in creating not just a newmodel
of advocacy, but also new and nimble organisational practices and a new style of
digitally savvy community organisers.5 Chadwick, however, warns against equat-
ing online activism with grassroots activism, arguing that what was considered
mainstream is now adapting to the use of multiple media, while newer communi-
cation forms are becoming mainstream, prompting him to speak of “systemic
hybridity”.6
As a recent phenomenon, online mass politics still lacks the empirical research
to support the strong claims and counter-claims that have been made about it,
such as that it strengthens democracy by increasing citizen participation or, on
the contrary, that “interactivity is evil”, serving to disarm resistance by giving
online participants a sense of agency.7 This exploratory research aims to contrib-
ute to ﬁlling the relative void in research, building the analytical tools to guide
further, more in-depth research. The author was interested in testing attributes
of “substantive” democracy, understood as a qualitatively stronger form of demo-
cratic practice, as advocated by political thinkers such as Dewey, Rawls, Barber
and Habermas. The notion that the current dominant form of liberal democracy
—mostly representative and aggregative, favouring majority rule—is not
enough by itself to guarantee all human, political and social rights has inspired
a “deepening democracy” debate that explores theories of a more inclusive,
participatory or deliberative democracy.8
Due to the critical mass that a self-proclaimed movement such as Avaaz can
muster, and its success in capturing the attention of traditional media, coupled
with the sensitivity of many of the issues that their petitions broach, the author
2. Andrew Chadwick, “Digital Network Repertoires and Organizational Hybridity”, Political Com-
munication, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2007), p. 284.
3. David Karpf, The MoveOn Effect: The Unexpected Transformation of American Political Advocacy (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
4. Ibid., p. 50.
5. Ibid., chapter 2.
6. Andrew Chadwick, The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013).
7. Kylie Jarrett, “Interactivity is Evil! A Critical Investigation of Web 2.0″, First Monday, Vol. 13, No. 3
(2008), doi: 10.5210/fm.v13i3.2140.
8. John Gaventa, “Triumph, Deﬁcit or Contestation? Deepening the ‘Deepening Democracy’ Debate”,
Working Paper 264 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2006).
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argues that their activities constitute an attempt at governance, therefore justifying
the application of a deeper democratic framework.
The questions that guided the case study analysis were: What type of organis-
ation is Avaaz: can it be considered an international NGO, a social movement or
an interest group? How is the Avaaz community structured and governed? What
is the democratic quality of the practices Avaaz employs and promotes? How sub-
stantive are the self-stated democratic purpose of Avaaz, the participation of its
members and the democratic results of its campaigns?
This article is structured as follows. After providing a theoretical context for
the phenomenon of mass digital politics, the author brieﬂy presents the meth-
odology of the case study and the framework for democratic quality that was
used to critically assess Avaaz’s mobilisation practices. The author will then
present and discuss the results of the analysis for each of the democratic
criteria.
New Forms of Public Participation in Global Governance
Governance and participation are both relatively recent terms and require some
clariﬁcation. Bevir deﬁnes governance as the process of governing, but argues
that in empirical terms nowadays it refers to “processes of rule wherever they
occur”.9 New actors and a variety of organisational forms have not only extended
governance beyond governments’ purview, but also transformed it into a desirable
practice, to which contemporary frameworks for “good governance”10 can attest,
offering guiding principles such as consensus-oriented public participation, stra-
tegic vision, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, effectiveness, efﬁciency,
equitability and inclusiveness.
Participation is understood as “the process by which an organization consults
with interested or affected individuals, organizations, and government entities
before making a decision”.11 Participation by non-state actors has become the
norm, enshrined in international treaties such as the 1992 Rio Declaration and
the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance.12 Unfortunately, in prac-
tice, this participation of non-state actors in decision-making on issues of the
common good has been found lacking in substance: used merely as an end in
itself,13 not linked to practical outcomes,14 hampered by bias towards citizens’
9. Mark Bevir, Governance: A Very Short Introduction (Hampshire: Oxford University Press, 2012).
10. See, for example, John Graham, Bruce Amos and Timothy W. Plumptre, Governance Principles for
Protected Areas in the 21st Century (Ottawa, Canada: Institute on Governance, 2003); UN governance
guidelines, available: <http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/Good
GovernanceIndex.aspx> (accessed 20 June 2013).
11. “IAP2: Good Public Participation Results in Better Decisions”, available: <http://www.iap2.org/>
(accessed 6 December 2015).
12. EU Commission, “European Governance—A White Paper”, COM (25 July 2001), available:
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-01-10_en.htm> (accessed 30 June 2013).
13. Ulrike Felt and Maximilian Fochler, “The Bottom-Up Meanings of the Concept of Public Partici-
pation in Science and Technology”, Science and Public Policy, Vol. 35, No. 7 (2008), pp. 489–499.
14. Alan Irwin, “Constructing the Scientiﬁc Citizen: Science andDemocracy in the Biosciences”, Public
Understanding of Science, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2001), pp. 1–18.
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capacity for rational decision-making15 or simply resulting in decisions that are not
binding.16
Whether despite or because of the disillusionment with formal public partici-
pation and the lack of results in global governance, uninvited forms of participation
in policy-making have sprung up, changing the political landscape from easily
identiﬁable and clearly delimited political actors to a myriad of amorphous organ-
isations and movements that act across borders. According to Keane,17 we are cur-
rently living in monitory democracies in most parts of the world, embodied by
special interest lobby groups, NGOs, public commissions and forums, think
tanks, international covenants, earth watch organisations, bloggers, whistle-
blowers and legal class actions. The topography of politics has changed: political
discourse, debate and judgement increasingly take place next to or across the insti-
tutions that traditionally hold political power. Faced with democratic and ecologi-
cal deﬁcits in the representative forms of democracy available to them, these new
actors experiment with new forms of democracy.
Proponents of cosmopolitan democracy theories imagine that a global civil
society or global democracy18 is in the making, with social and economic actors
ﬁlling the void of representation and legitimate policy-making,19 reining in the
power of supranational agencies and transnational corporations. Castells proposes
four typologies to help understand the new dynamics:20 (1) the (older) local interest
groups that continue to defend local interests and/or speciﬁc values; (2) the fairly
recent international NGOs that have conquered a formal seat and a voice, if not
a vote, at the negotiating tables for international agreements; (3) the social move-
ments, calling upon global solidarity to survive and assert their rights, connecting
local resistance groups in a network to counter the usurpation of democracy by
powerful governments and corporate interests; and (4) the movement of public
opinion,21 which has been facilitated by the spread of Information and Communi-
cation Technologies (ICTs). In Castells’deﬁnition, social movements are essentially
democratic movements that call for “new forms of political representation of
people’s will and interests in the process of global governance”,22 whereas move-
ments of public opinion are “spontaneous, ad hoc mobilizations using horizontal,
autonomous communications systems”.23 Examples of this latter form of partici-
pation are the Acampada and Occupy movements, clamouring for “real” democ-
racy, that spread across the globe in 2011. Within this typology, MoveOn and
Avaaz and similar organisations represent a hybrid form of activism, combining
second-generation characteristics, like those of Occupy, with traits of more
15. Claire Marris, Brian Wynne, Peter Simmons and Sue Weldon, Public Perceptions of Agricultural Bio-
technologies in Europe (Lancaster, UK: Lancaster University, 2001).
16. Richard E. Sclove, Reinventing Technology Assessment: A 21st Century Model (Washington, DC:
Science and Technology Innovation Program, WoodrowWilson International Center for Scholars, 2010).
17. John Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (London: Simon and Schuster, 2009).
18. Daniele Archibugi, “Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review”, European Journal of
International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2004), pp. 437–473.
19. Manuel Castells, “Global Governance and Global Politics”, Political Science and Politics, Vol. 38, No.
1 (2005), pp. 9–16.
20. Castells, “The New Public Sphere”, op. cit., pp. 83–86.
21. Ibid., p. 86.
22. Ibid., pp. 85–86.
23. Ibid., p. 86.
104 Lanka Horstink
traditional advocacy organisations (e.g. the centralisation of decision-making, the
use of experts, and a strong focus on media value of the causes embraced).
Public Participation on the Internet and Global Democracy
In the 1990s the internet was seen as a facilitator for the participatory democracy
that many believed was in the making, and scholars marvelled at its potential as
an expanded public sphere where rational-critical citizen discourse could
thrive.24 Since broadcasting centres are at the strategic core of political power,
the internet and its possibilities for low-cost broadcasting to large numbers of
other citizens (many-to-many) is a potential enabling factor for democracy, bypass-
ing traditional power centres.25
Dahlgren observes that the various groups, networks, organisations and social
movements that are engaged in global politics all make use of ICTs in some way
or another.26 International NGOs are successfully using social media tools that
allow for rapid sharing of text, sound, image and video in “bitesize” form to
pressure governments and corporations. Governments themselves and their poli-
ticians use ICTs to personalise their messages and gauge public opinion. Social
movements are using social media to mobilise, organise and publicise. Finally,
new, exclusively digital-based organisations, like Change.org, Avaaz and 38
Degrees have created platforms that allow citizens to pressure both national and
supranational governance institutions on a wide range of social, political and eco-
logical issues. Their work falls under the category of online mobilisation, an inde-
pendent form of online participation in which citizens try to inﬂuence public
opinion and policy-making directly, either spontaneously or driven by an organis-
ation or interest group. It contrasts with the more formal exponent of the online
participation phenomenon, which has been dubbed e-democracy. Whereas for
some scholars27 e-democracy is a complement to representative democracy—
using ICTs to engage citizens and support democratic decision-making processes
—for others, in particular deliberative democrats, it contains within it the possibi-
lities of a genuine public sphere in the Habermasian sense.28
The nature and effectiveness of online participation andmobilisation has spurred
a debate where extreme views collide (compare Castells’29 enthusiasm to Moro-
zov’s30 scepticism), and different approaches (social network analysis vs media
analysis), as well as different foci (formal vs spontaneous e-participation initiat-
ives), limit the drawing of conclusions. Some tendencies can however be identiﬁed.
24. Lincoln Dahlberg, “The Internet and Democratic Discourse: Exploring the Prospects of Online
Deliberative Forums Extending the Public Sphere”, Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 4, No. 4
(2001), pp. 615–633.
25. Castells, “The New Public Sphere”, op. cit., p. 90.
26. Peter Dahlgren, “Participation and Alternative Democracy: Social Media and Their Contingen-
cies”, in P. Serra, E. Camilo and G. Gonçalves (eds.), Participação Política e Web 2.0 (Covilhã: LabCom
Books, 2013), pp. 57–82.
27. Ann Macintosh, “Characterizing E-participation in Policy-Making”, in Proceedings of the 37th
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (Washington, DC: Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers Computer Society, 2004), 10 pp.
28. Dahlberg, op. cit.
29. Manuel Castells, The Information Age. Volume Three: End of Millennium (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).
30. Evgeny Morozov, “Whither Internet Control?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2011),
pp. 62–74.
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An important empirical ﬁnding relates to the way internet users tend to polarise
their judgements, either moderating or radicalising their view depending on
whether the evidence challenges or supports them. According to Karpf, internet
advocacy organisations will always tend to be polarised, because moderate views
are not mobilising.31 Another repeated observation about online dynamics is the
relative advantage of users with high social capital: not only do they account for
most of the active contributions in online social networks, but they are also more
likely to see increases in social capital through the use of these networks.32 And
despite the fact that online participants do not merely overlap with ofﬂine partici-
pants (online participants tend to be younger), both groups nevertheless continue
to share a predominance of the male gender and of higher socio-economic
groups.33 Another study also showed that students are signiﬁcantly more likely to
use the internet for political purposes than unemployed youngsters.34 It seems the
digital divide, despite the fact that the number of internet users reached the three
billionmark in 2014,35 still excludes not onlymost people fromdeveloping countries
(75% of internet users are from the top 20 most connected countries), but also many
people from economically disadvantaged backgrounds in developed countries.
Whetheronlineparticipation canbe consideredeffective ormeaningful continues to
be a subject ofmuchdebate, as is evident inKavada’s review.36 There is some evidence
that, in general, politics on the net is “politics as usual”37 (the so-called normalisation
theme), and that online discussions do not justify classifying the internet as a public
sphere of inclusive, independent, rational-critical discourse.38 Gladwell argues that
online participation builds only weak ties between action participants, not enough
toactually take themto the streets.39Morozov criticises thephenomenonof the “slack-
tivist”: the internet user that clicks to like, share or approve without discussion, what
he calls “feel-good online activism that has zero political or social impact”.40
31. Karpf, op. cit., p. 10.
32. Barry Wellman, Anabel Quan Haase, James Witte and Keith Hampton, “Does the Internet
Increase, Decrease, or Supplement Social Capital? Social Networks, Participation, and Community Com-
mitment”, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2001), pp. 437–456.
33. Jennifer Oser, Marc Hooghe and Soﬁe Marien, “Is Online Participation Distinct from Ofﬂine Par-
ticipation? A Latent Class Analysis of Participation Types and Their Stratiﬁcation”, Political Research
Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 1 (2013), pp. 91–101.
34. Rachel Gibson and Marta Cantijoch, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Participation in the Age of
the Internet: Is Online Political Engagement Really Different to Ofﬂine?”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 75,
No. 3 (2013), pp. 701–716.
35. Internet Live Stats, available: <http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/> (accessed 15
October 2015).
36. Anastasia Kavada, “Engagement, Bonding, and Identity across Multiple Platforms: Avaaz on
Facebook, YouTube, and MySpace”, MedieKultur: Journal of Media and Communication Research, Vol. 52
(2012), pp. 28–48.
37. Michael Margolis and David Resnick, Politics as Usual: The Cyberspace “Revolution” (London: Sage,
2000); Pippa Norris, Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
38. Dahlberg, op. cit.; Andrew Chadwick, “Web 2.0: New Challenges for the Study of E-democracy in
an Era of Informational Exuberance”, Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, Vol. 5 (2008),
pp. 9–42.
39. Malcolm Gladwell, “Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted”, The New Yorker,
Vol. 4 (2010), pp. 42–49.
40. Evgeny Morozov, “The Brave New World of Slacktivism”, Foreign Policy (May 2009), available:
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104302141> (accessed 10 June 2013).
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More nuanced views, such as Gerbaudo’s, ﬁnd some “valuable attempts to rein-
vent democracy” but also several risks, such as the disregard for minority views,
authoritarian tendencies and what he calls “techno-plebiscitarianism” (equivalent
to de Tocqueville’s “tyranny of the majority”) and “techno-proceduralism” (an
“obsession with web procedures and tools”).41 Gerbaudo believes that mass
logics of communication have returned to the internet, where just one social
network site, Facebook, has over a billion users, and communication tools have
become homogenised, pointing to a possible loss in the autonomy and diversity
that the internet was initially heralded for. He identiﬁes a new form of populism
practised by online political organisers, where the average internet user becomes
the new “common man” at whom appeals are launched to go beyond his or her
“individualised condition and to use their connectivity as a springboard to join a
collective mobilisation”.42
Karpf andChadwick also offer a thirdway for assessing the impact of ICTs on col-
lective action, by presenting evidence that the use of digital communication technol-
ogies is creating a hybrid form ofmobilisation that has revolutionised the concept of
membership and the tactics for fundraising, which have both become ﬂexible and
ﬂuid.43 Organisational hybrids such as MoveOn, Get Up!, 38 Degrees and Avaaz
switch between repertoires (a “limited set of routines”44) and between media
with hereto unseen organisational ﬂexibility, using online media for “tight feedback
loops, coordination, more active engagement, and representing the movement to
itself”, and traditional media as a sign of “its efﬁcacy for wider publics”,45 while
sometimes complementing communication with staged protest events.
Chadwick has observed that for these organisations, speed is of the highest
essence.46 The use of real-time response is more than a communication tactic; it
is a strategy to generate the authenticity and legitimacy needed to keep supporters
engaged. Studying the online advocacy group 38 Degrees, Chadwick ﬁnds that
these type of organisations blend long-term planning with “nimble” responses as
events unfold, or as one of the leaders he interviewed put it, “being opportunistic
within a strategic framework”.47
Recent research shows that we must be careful to apply labels to the new inter-
net-enabled organisations and movements. Whereas he considered MoveOn, from
whence Avaaz stems, a “top-down manufactured community”, Chadwick encoun-
tered in 38 Degrees a mixture of leadership and incorporation of supporters’wishes
through the monitoring of social media sites, blog posts, online polls and peti-
tions.48 Hestres found the organisation 350.org to be a “headline generator”
41. Paolo Gerbaudo, “Populism 2.0: Social Media Activism, the Generic Internet User and Interactive
Direct Democracy”, in D. Trottier and C. Fuchs (eds.), Social Media, Politics and the State: Protests, Revolu-
tions, Riots, Crime and Policing in the Age of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (New York and Oxon: Routledge,
2014), pp. 67–87.
42. Ibid., p. 79.
43. Karpf, op. cit.; Chadwick, The Hybrid Media System, op. cit.
44. Chadwick, “Digital Network Repertoires”, op. cit., p. 285.
45. Chadwick, The Hybrid Media System, op. cit., p. 193.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 192.
48. Andrew Chadwick and James Dennis, “Social Media, Professional Media and Mobilisation in
Contemporary Britain: Explaining the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Citizens’ Movement 38
Degrees”, Political Studies, online ﬁrst (May 2016), doi: 10.1177/0032321716631350.
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rather than chaser,49 reaching out to people who are already alarmed by climate
change and to whom they offer online as well as ofﬂine actions, empowering
local organisers with campaigning tools. These studies also show that organis-
ational capacity and leadership are important variables in most of the current pol-
itical mobilisations on the internet, contradicting the initial conclusions pointing at
“organizing without organizations”.50
Methodology
The data collected for this case study include self-presentations by Avaaz’s mana-
ging team (either on their website or in public interviews), historical and docu-
mental data on the organisation, Avaaz’s communication tools, self-descriptions
of their campaigns, communications within the Avaaz community, reports by
external parties and other researchers, news reports on the campaigns, and data
available on the context of these campaigns. Most of the data were collected
online between May and June 2013, with some data complemented in 2014 and
2015. As much as space allows, data sources are referred to in the text. The
author had access to email communications between Avaaz and its members
since 2007, the year of its inception, having signed up at this time.
Data from the website were analysed using features analysis, used by Foot and
Schneider to analyse the role of websites in US election campaigns.51 Features
analysis is a form of web content analysis that records the occurrence of available
features for interaction and participation on a website.
This was complemented by an exploratory form of critical discourse analysis,52
where discourse is understood as a particular way of representing aspects of
social life, including aspects that are desired or possible worlds. Discourses
reveal the social practices (more or less stable and durable forms of social activity)
and thus the social structures to which the discursants adhere, revealing relations
of power and dominance in society. The author was interested in the social struc-
tures that inform Avaaz’s practices, which can be found in their use of value-
laden concepts such as democracy, participation, economy and freedom, in their
explanation of the events that they campaign on and in the strategies they promote.
Avaaz’s observable practices were ﬁrst classiﬁed according to the features on
their website and social media pages that are available for interaction with
members, such as mission statements, “take action” features, campaign highlights,
campaign information, press releases and counters or tickers.
These features of interaction, together with the content and form of Avaaz’s com-
munications (email communications being their primary tool), were then compared
to the criteria for substantive democracy distilled for the purpose of a previous case
study analysing the Rio+20 discourses.53 These categories were compiled from a list
49. Luis Hestres, “Preaching to the Choir: Internet-Mediated Advocacy, Issue Public Mobilization,
and Climate Change”, New Media Society, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2014), pp. 323–339.
50. Chadwick and Dennis, op. cit., p. 24.
51. Kirsten A. Foot and Steven M. Schneider, Web Campaigning (Cambridge, MA and London: The
MIT Press, 2006).
52. Norman Fairclough, “Critical Discourse Analysis as a Method in Social Scientiﬁc Research”, in
R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.), Introducing Qualitative Methods: Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis
(London: Sage Publications, 2001), pp. 121–138.
53. Lanka Horstink, “Es sostenible si es comercializable: la brecha democrática y ecológica en el dis-
curso del desarrollismo verde”, Ecologia Política, No. 44 (2013), pp. 15–20.
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of workable attributes of deep democracy, based on the reﬂections of proponents of
deliberative, deep and radical democracy, in particular theories of ecological
democracy. Their selection was motivated by a quest for democratic quality, under-
stood as an ideal democratic practice that, at a time when humanity faces enormous
social-ecological challenges, embraces notions of social and environmental justice,
deemed by many of the deep democrats to repair the shortcomings of a liberal
democracy that is more focused on the protection of civil rights than on the devel-
opment of true equality and freedom. Since Avaaz campaigns on issues of social
and environmental justice, an ecological democratic framework to analyse their
practices appears as the logical choice. For the purpose of this case study, the cri-
teria of “guaranteeing equity”, “autonomy or control over resources” (a stronger
version of freedom) and “capacity for altruism” were not considered, as they
relate more speciﬁcally to the governance of resources. Also, to be able to
compare between “basic” and “stronger” democratic criteria, the author decided
to add four basic democratic dimensions, which are usually not contested among
democratic theorists. Below follows a list of criteria used and a brief explanation
for their inclusion.
1. Basic democratic dimensions (what most democratic theorists agree on in the
context of public participation, based on Ostling,54 who adapted these attributes
to e-democracy contexts):
i. equality (participation without domination of any group’s interests
and without discrimination on the basis of factors such as gender,
age, ethnicity or socio-economic group);
ii. freedom (transparent and accountable moderation—including the fea-
tures available for people to participate and how accessible these are—
and respect for privacy);
iii. transparency/accountability (balanced and comprehensible presen-
tation of the information informing policies, and of the process and
results);
iv. responsiveness (the participants’ inﬂuence on the topics discussed on
the platform in question (responsiveness of Avaaz) and their ultimate
inﬂuence on policy agendas and policies of the targeted governing
agencies (responsiveness of Avaaz’s actions);
2. Active equitable inclusion: a stronger version of equality, seeking to include and
empower all interested parties in the decision-making process. Based on Haber-
mas’s conditions for the public sphere;55
3. Social legitimacy: can be construed as a strong version of accountability or demo-
cratic legitimacy when those who bear the consequences of decisions by others
have a ﬁnal say in decision-making;56
54. Alina Ostling, “How Democratic is E-participation?”, in Proceedings of the International Conference
for E-Democracy and Open Government (Krems, Austria: Edition Donau-Universität Krems, 2011),
pp. 59–70.
55. Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of
Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
56. Deliberative democrats prefer the term “democratic legitimacy”, whereas social legitimacy has
been used more often in legal contexts. The latter term is, however, closer to Habermas’s idea of legiti-
macy as requiring the consent of all those to whom decisions or laws will apply.
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4. The use of deliberation: converging on common interests through the advance-
ment of rational-critical arguments.57 In the deliberative democracy tradition,
which has solidiﬁed considerably in the last decades, the debates are expected
to take place in terms of conceptions of the common good as opposed to bargain-
ing for particular interests. The more deliberative forms of participatory pro-
cesses tend to score higher on broad quality criteria (such as joint gains,
added information and innovative ideas) than less intensive stakeholder pro-
cesses.58 Most deliberative democrats believe the deliberative procedure to be
the main source of legitimacy;
5. Reﬂexivity: an attitude of collective self-awareness, self-inquiry and self-confron-
tation that is deemed a necessary condition to break with path dependency in
decision-making and for social learning in democratic practices to occur;59
6. Cognitive justice: the constitutional right of different systems of knowledge to
exist as part of a dialogue and debate, thereby strengthening the participation
of lesser-recognised groups with cognitive representation, democratising
knowledge itself.60
When appropriate and possible, data were analysed by cross-checking presented
facts. Sources of claims and counter-claims are presented along the analysis
where space allows.
A Case Study for the “New Global Democracy”: Avaaz
In the next sections, Avaaz’s governance of the community it created and its public
campaigning activities will be analysed according to each of the attributes for
democratic quality deﬁned in the methodology section.
Avaaz and Basic Democratic Dimensions
Equality
The research revealed several obstacles to equality in Avaaz’s community, among
them the risk of domination of speciﬁc group interests over others and a bias
towards higher socio-economic groups. Firstly, several relatively powerful groups
have been identiﬁed by the author as part of the executive and wider support struc-
ture of Avaaz, among them MoveOn, GetUp! and a foundation of the billionaire
George Soros, who funded Avaaz at the start-up.61 Their founders, including
those of Avaaz, are usually active in more than one digital movement, self-
57. Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy”, in J. Bohman andW. Rehg (eds.),Delib-
erative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 67–91.
58. See, among others, Michel Pimbert and TomWakeford, “Prajateerpu, Power and Knowledge: The
Politics of Participatory Action Research in Development Part 1. Context, Process and Safeguards”,
Action Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2003), pp. 184–207.
59. Jan-Peter Voss and Dierk Bauknecht (eds.), Reﬂexive Governance for Sustainable Development
(Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006).
60. Shiv Visvanathan, “Knowledge, Justice and Democracy”, in M. Leach, I. Scoones and B. Wynne
(eds.), Science and Citizens (London: Zed Books, 2005), pp. 83–94.
61. Tax returns for the Open Society Institute in 2008 and the Foundation to Promote Open Society in
2009, the latter published by the NGOwatchdog Guidestar, with endowments for Avaaz of respectively
US$250,000 and 600,000 through Res Publica, available: <http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990pf_pdf_
archive/137/137029285/137029285_200812_990PF.pdf> and <http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/
2009/263/753/2009-263753801-068647db-F.pdf> (accessed 20 October 2013).
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describing their profession as creating “new organizations and ventures to tackle
issues where mass participation and collective action can unlock big change”.62
Secondly, the available features for participants’ involvement in Avaaz’s activities
as listed in Table 1 are limited to signing one of six petitions (as a rule Avaaz never
places more than six campaigns at a time on their website), donating, joining for
email alerts and either writing a short story about what Avaaz means to them or
approving (“heart-ing”) someone else’s story.
Those who visit the yearly poll may also leave a message there, similar to a Face-
book wall message. On Avaaz’s social media pages, users of these networks can
leave (moderated) comments. A more interactive feature, which Avaaz started
offering a few years after their launch, is the possibility of subscribers launching
their own petitions. There is, however, no guarantee that Avaaz will share this peti-
tion with the other subscribers. Furthermore, although Avaaz offers a choice of 15
languages, the social media content is overwhelmingly in English. On the whole,
communication is restricted to one-to-many and many-to-one: Avaaz communi-
cates with its subscribers and subscribers leave messages that are overwhelmingly
directed at Avaaz, offering “solidarity, thanks, and congratulations”.63
Avaaz has no general assembly, instead, like a company, it has an appointed
executive board.64 There is no mechanism for outside groups or members to inﬂu-
ence Avaaz’s governance. Like other digitally networked NGOs, Avaaz uses A/B
(split) testing of campaigns on samples of subscribers, but this is not the same as
co-deciding campaign priorities, since it has already been decided what will be
tested. Avaaz started conducting yearly polls in 2013, where supporters rate priori-
ties and campaign ideas, and rate Avaaz.65 The phrasing of the priorities and cam-
paign choices can be considered broad, both in wording (“Every Child in School—
work to get funding and political action so that the children that are still out of
school, many because of wars or natural disasters, get an education”) and as a
whole (from combatting slavery and violence towards women, to “saving the
Amazon” and elephants, or obtaining peace in Syria). At the same time, the
choices direct users towards one strategy rather than another (for example when
Avaaz asks users to campaign to end the grip of the corporation Monsanto on
the food system) and some priorities are extremely speciﬁc, such as the demand
for peace in Syria at a time when civil war is raging in many other countries—
including neighbouring countries Afghanistan and Iraq—or the call to “Clean-
out US corruption”, speciﬁcally linked to the upcoming elections.
Avaaz’s membership functions through self-selection, which as a democratic
mechanism has already been found defective, since it tends to reinforce existing
dominant groups.66 Looking at the proﬁle of the Avaaz community, which has
recently become available with the yearly polls, we can observe that subscribers
are becoming younger: whereas nearly 63% were parents in 2014, in 2016 this
62. Purpose.com, launched by an Avaaz co-founder, available: <http://www.purpose.com/> (accessed
16 June 2013). On the site we can read: “We build movements” (…) “from the ground up”.
63. Kavada, “Engagement, Bonding, and Identity”, op. cit.
64. The decision structure is brieﬂy presented in Avaaz’s ﬁnancial statements, available: <http://www.
avaaz.org/en/avaaz_expenses_and_ﬁnancial_information/> (accessed 21 October 2013).
65. Avaaz yearly poll 2016, available: <https://secure.avaaz.org/en/poll_results_2016/> (accessed 25
May 2016).
66. Archon Fung, “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance”, Public Administration Review,
Vol. 66, Special Issue (2006), pp. 66–75.
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Table 1. Features Analysis of the Tools for Interaction Used by Avaaz.
Features for interaction Avaaz website Email alert list
Other webpages
(Facebook, YouTube etc.)
Features readily available > Homepage with 6 main campaigns;
campaigns have short texts and occasionally
a video
> Slogan
> About Us
> Selected testimonies from public ﬁgures and
from Avaaz “members”
> Stories of Us
> Start your Own Petition
> Ticker of number of “members”
> Ticker of recent signatures “Happening right
now”
> Campaign highlights
> Media centre
> Donate buttons
> Act now buttons (repeated on average 12
times on homepage)
> Connect with Avaaz on FB and Twitter or
“Like” Avaaz
> Avaaz By the Numbers: tickers for number of
members, actions taken and countries
> Statement on Commitment to Accuracy
Links to additional
information
Link to sign the petition
Link to donate
Link to “share with
friends” (after
signing)
> Mission
> Status update
> Slogan
> Date founded
> Website URL
> Links to other networking and
content-sharing sites
> Comments
> Videos and photos
> List of main followers, among them
MoveOn.org, GetUp! and 350.org
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Secondary features and
features “buried” in the
webpages
> Contact Avaaz
> Privacy Policy and Terms of Use
> Access to latest poll
> Access to Forum for latest poll (only
accessible on poll page)
> Financial reports
> Daily brieﬁng (not accessible from the
website and discontinued)
What visitors can do > Act now—signing petitions (automatically
counted as a member)
> Donate
> Start their own petition
> Join for email alerts (automatically counted
as a member)
> Write a “Story of Us” (moderated by Avaaz)
> “Heart” other Stories of Us
> Leave a comment (only available for those
who visit the poll and moderated)
> Read supporting
information
> Sign petition
> Donate
> Forward to friends
> “Like” Avaaz
> “Like” individual posts
> Comment on posts (moderated)
> Watch videos and photos
> Accept invitations to attend Avaaz
events
> See who else is a “friend” of Avaaz
> Forward/share
> Receive RSS feeds of updates
O
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dropped to 49%. The tendency for Avaaz supporters to come from an educational
or university background has also diminished from around 20% in 2014 to just
under 16% in 2016. But members still predominate in Anglo-Saxon, European
and BRICS countries, with over 3 million from North America, close to 20
million from Europe and a staggering 10 million from Brazil. Nevertheless,
Mexico has over 1.3 million subscribers. China and the ex-USSR have low partici-
pation, with the exception of Russia. African and East Asian countries are barely
represented, with the exception of South Africa and some North African countries.
Although more research would be needed to detail exactly how Avaaz decides
on campaign priorities, the information presented above on the structure of the
organisation and its team, the proﬁle of subscribers and the limited participation
allowed them, indicates a substantial risk for the domination of an elite group’s
interests, undermining equality.
Freedom
Freedom in online participation settings depends mostly on the transparency and
accountability of moderation and the features available for participation. Avaaz’s
community members, as we have seen, are not completely free to express their
views, there being no platform for discussion, only a few moderated spaces for
leaving comments, for which they need to be a member of a social media site.
On the website, subscribers may only leave short stories of who they are and
why they joined Avaaz, which other subscribers may then approve. Supporters
also cannot communicate among themselves, but need to direct their comments
at Avaaz.
Avaaz operates an opt-out model, meaning that people who sign up for their
email alerts or sign their petitions are automatically counted as a member, unless
they explicitly object. The opt-out model is legal, but lacks transparency; it
would be more straightforward to ask people if they wish to join Avaaz. It is
unclear if any of the subscribers have opted out or how many of the over 40
million subscribers are still active. Just as there is no ofﬁcial way of joining the
movement, there is none for leaving. Also, although Avaaz does give a guarantee
of privacy of personal data to participants, in return they demand that all content
provided by members (including petitions started by members) becomes the prop-
erty of Avaaz.
Overall, as revealed by the features analysis, participants of Avaaz have very
limited choices both for communication and for action available to them. Of all the
online advocacy organisations, Avaaz is the one with the least interactive features
(MoveOn offers comments on its site and several choices of online and ofﬂine
actions). Avaaz’s executive director, Ricken Patel, has in numerous interviews
stated that Avaaz purposefully chose a more centralised model, where, despite
regular feedback surveys, “priorities and methods of the organisation are actually
determined by a fairly small group of decision-makers”.67 The general argument
presented by Avaaz senior staff is that there is a difference between becoming
involved and wanting to be empowered in deciding what the group does. This
interpretation of supporters’ wishes gives Avaaz a rather broad mandate.
67. Molly Beutz Land, “Networked Activism”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 22 (2009), pp. 205–
243.
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However, this is a dilemma that the traditional NGOs also face: the trade-off
between participation and the need to maintain an image of unity and coherence
to allow for broad mobilisation. There is a fear that online interaction may
expose fractures within the group or network.68 Additionally, it may be argued
that the internet provides these participants with alternative forums, if they
wish, by starting their own social media groups. But for several reasons we
should expect a more careful governance: this is the largest online community
and the issues that are promoted may interfere with the sovereignty of countries
outside of the promoter’s purview. It would be sad, and potentially dangerous, if
Avaaz only used its numbers to put critical mass behind the issues it wishes to
promote.
Transparency/accountability
Of the democratic quality dimensions deﬁned by the author, this is the one with the
most evidence to support a negative conclusion. To begin with, Avaaz supplies no
speciﬁc information on how their organisation or the community they have created
is being governed. There is no information on the statutes of the organisation, or on
the team behind Avaaz, let alone information on the principles to guide the “com-
munity”, the process of decision-making or how results are evaluated. The tax
forms that Avaaz started publishing in 2012 present very broad categories for rev-
enues and expenses, making it impossible to verify the sources or destinations of
Avaaz’s money. For example, there is no evidence to support the claims of millions
of US dollars given to Burmese monks. Some information, like those identifying
donors of larger sums, has been redacted before publication. There are no yearly
activity reports, nor does Avaaz publish campaign reports. In the Highlights
section a selection of allegedly successful campaigns is presented with very short
descriptions that do not allow for independent veriﬁcation of the claims of
victory or explain how money was spent. Many of the campaigns do not link
back to the original appeal and there is evidence that unsuccessful, less successful,
or controversial campaigns disappear from the website.69
Although keeping information on a need-to-know level can be comprehensible
for an organisation that mass communicates with millions of people, from a per-
spective of social responsibility, more information should be available for those
requesting it. Considering that Avaaz receives considerable donations from its sub-
scribers, and not only claims it is 100% member-funded but also calls its members
its “bosses”,70 it follows that as stakeholders in an organisation, members should be
entitled to know how the money is spent. Instead there are no follow-ups on
speciﬁc, generally urgent donation requests made by Avaaz and that involve con-
siderable sums of money: rough estimates from the respective petition pages show
68. Scott Wright and Stephen Coleman, “The Third Sector as E-democratic Intermediaries”, in
S. Coleman and P.M. Shane (eds.), Connecting Democracy: Online Consultation and the Flow of Political Com-
munication (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012), pp. 209–228.
69. To give an example of this practice, the much criticised militaristic appeal by Avaaz for a no-ﬂy
zone in Libya <https://secure.avaaz.org/en/libya_no_ﬂy_zone_1/?rc=fb> has been rephrased as “lives
saved in Libya” through “asset freezes and protective action” and the information about how many
people signed the appeal for a no-ﬂy zone has been removed from the (now orphaned) page.
70. James Ball, “Avaaz: Can Online Campaigning Reinvent Politics”, The Guardian, 15 January 2013,
available: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/15/avaaz-online-campaigning-reinvent-politics>
(accessed 21 May 2013).
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Avaaz collected approximately €250,000 to “break Monsanto’s grip on our politics
and our food” (no action plan was offered).71 They also may have collected as much
as €300,000 to help create a “global opinion poll in dozens of countries that clearly
shows this is not a fringe movement”.72 There is no evidence whatsoever that the
afore-mentioned projects ever saw the light of day. Avaaz has never campaigned
against Monsanto, although it has used the name repeatedly to ask for donations.73
These campaigns and requests have disappeared from Avaaz’s self-reported
history on the Highlights page and all page links eliminated.
Avaaz, as do other advocacy organisations when using the internet, uses persua-
sive language and the occasional poignant photograph to help galvanise its suppor-
ters and push through messages in very short time periods. The wording in emails,
their main tool, is invariably dramatic and always urgent,74 asking members to “act
now” or “donate now”. Information given is very brief, focusing on one main
reason why subscribers should help, and providing some links to newspaper
articles for context. A communication tactic frequently used by Avaaz is to
mention unnamed expert advisors75 to legitimise their requests to support a
cause, potentially providing Avaaz with deniability if the information does not
pan out. The asks of petitions are usually multiple, potentially providing more
opportunities to claim victory, as in the Whale campaign: “prohibit the transit of
whale meat through Dutch ports and help end the global trade in whales”76
(emphasis added).
Avaaz’s directors self-describe their campaigning style as obeying a formula of
“crisistunity”:77 to spur people to sign or donate, a time frame for action is set
(usually a few days, sometimes hours), with an initial objective (which can be
adjusted if success allows), and a description of a situation that is always as
much a crisis as it is an opportunity. The crisis is usually presented in the title
and in the ﬁrst line, whereas the opportunity (to sign or donate to “make a differ-
ence”) follows straight after.
From the emails the author received between 2008 and 2013, Avaaz is estimated
to have initiated about 60 campaigns in this time period. To ﬁnd a history of these
campaigns, however, the author had to use internet search engines because the
Avaaz site does not have a search function. Avaaz does not even list all ongoing
petitions but limits the offer to six rotating campaigns promoted on their
homepage.
71. Avaaz, “Break Monsanto’s Grip” (April 2013), available: <https://secure.avaaz.org/en/stop_
monsanto_nddon/> (accessed 30 June 2013).
72. Avaaz, “The 99% Speak Out” (2011), previously available: <https://secure.avaaz.org/en/fund_the_
99_poll/> (accessed 30 June 2013). This appeal was removed some time after the author accessed it; rem-
nants of its existence can be found on other sites: <http://goldenageofgaia.com/2011/11/25/avaaz-plans-
global-opinion-poll/> (accessed 2 November 2016).
73. In this example, Avaaz asks for money for an unspeciﬁed seed bank, available: <https://secure.
avaaz.org/en/seed_exchange_donate_loc/?pv=667&rc=fb> (accessed 10 May 2016).
74. For examples of wording, click on each of the campaigns promoted on the homepage, available:
<https://www.avaaz.org/en/index.php> (accessed 12 May 2016).
75. Avaaz, “Europe: Lead on Efﬁciency” (2013), available: <http://www.avaaz.org/en/refrigerator_
revolution_video/> (accessed 2 November 2013); Avaaz, “US Government: Fast-Track African Lions as
Endangered!” (2015), available: <https://secure.avaaz.org/en/us_list_endangered_african_lions/?pv=
77&rc=fb> (accessed 20 December 2015).
76. Avaaz, “Days to Stop the Whale Massacre” (2013), available: <http://www.avaaz.org/en/days_to_
stop_the_whale_slaughter_global/> (accessed 28 June 2013).
77. Ball, op. cit.
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The opt-out model and very ﬂuid interpretation of membership, as seen under
Freedom, contributes to an image of opaque practices. And as seen previously,
website visitors have little information to go by and are restricted in their mobility.
Unlike traditional activist NGOs, and despite the fact that Avaaz claims to have
ofﬁces on six continents and a total staff of about 100, it is made difﬁcult for
members to contact Avaaz: the contact page is structured like that of any other
online service organisation, with FAQs and an online form. No contact details
are provided.
The yearly poll, the one opportunity for Avaaz members to pitch their vote, lacks
information on how many people participated. If people made open suggestions,
these have not been presented.
There are complaints that Avaaz has hooked onto successful campaigns in other
countries, moving those campaigns to their own site. The fact that the Avaaz peti-
tion on the Ficha Limpa, Brazil’s anti-corruption law, does not provide the usual
ticker for signatories, and the fact that in Brazil a citizen’s initiative is only valid
with real signatures and by providing proof of identity, lends some credence to
complaints that Avaaz took over a 1.6 million signature campaign already
running in Brazil. Newspaper articles show that the petition was presented to Con-
gress in September 2009, about seven months before Avaaz got involved.78
Responsiveness
Avaaz as an organisation has proven to be able to get many of the topics they push
onto political agendas and media bulletins all over the world, by their sheer speed
fomenting an attitude that values acting over talking. Their more successful peti-
tions are usually accompanied by an advertising campaign in the country in ques-
tion, which considerably raises awareness of the issue. As such, the responsiveness
of their actions in terms of media impact can be considered high. But when an
organisation claims its democratic mission is to “organize citizens of all nations
to close the gap between the world we have and the worldmost people everywhere
want” (About Us section), any result can be framed as a success. It was not possible
in the short time frame of this study to assess actual impacts, but there are indi-
cations that Avaaz is not upfront about campaign results, either by exaggerating
their role (as in the Ficha Limpa case and, more recently, the protest against glypho-
sate, which mobilised almost all advocacy organisations in this ﬁeld in Europe79) or
by disappearing less successful campaigns.
Looking at the degree of inﬂuence supporters are having on topics, agendas and
policies, i.e. the responsiveness of Avaaz towards its members, the record is less
favourable. Avaaz has ﬁnal say over the campaigns it runs and publishes limited
information on ongoing or past campaigns, or on any of its activities. As discussed
previously, campaign priorities and goals are usually phrased in very broad terms,
lacking clear strategies and action plans. The asks are framed in a way that is hard
78. Avaaz claims victory after Congress approves the law, available: <https://secure.avaaz.org/po/
brasil_ﬁcha_limpa/?pv=9&rc=fb>. English claim, available: <https://www.avaaz.org/en/vitoria_ﬁcha_
limpa/>. Proof that the petition was handed to Congress in September 2009, available: <http://g1.
globo.com/politica/noticia/2010/05/camara-conclui-votacao-e-projeto-ﬁcha-limpa-vai-ao-senado.html>
(accessed 30 June 2013).
79. Avaaz, “Protect our Health, Stop Monsanto” (March 2016), available: <https://secure.avaaz.org/
en/monsanto_dont_silence_science_loc/> (accessed 11 May 2016).
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to disagree with at ﬁrst glance, while at the same time their realisation will be
impossible to verify (“War on Women—Campaign to tackle the culture of violence
towards women and win reforms to end oppression and give women the power to
shape their own destinies”—2016 poll).
Despite its claim of being fully “member-driven” and having members as their
“bosses”, and despite having marketed the yearly polls as “the biggest exercise
in direct democracy ever undertaken”,80 Avaaz follows its own agenda.When com-
paring the priorities that came out of the polls of 2014 and 2015 with the campaigns
actually launched, the correspondence is weak: the repeatedly promised cam-
paigns on protecting the oceans, combatting Monsanto, ending modern slavery
and putting every child in school were not undertaken in 2014 nor 2015, without
explanation and even though money was collected for some of these campaigns.81
This unresponsiveness is not exclusive to Avaaz or online advocacy groups.
Traditional advocacy groups, as Beutz Land found in her research, despite
being considered representatives of the public interest, have also been called
“decidedly un-democratic and unaccountable to the people they claim to rep-
resent”.82 It is a common problem that plagues activism and largely has to do
with the trade-off discussed earlier, between meaningful participation and
larger mobilisation. Beutz Land claims the risk is partially offset by the professio-
nalisation of these NGOs, but nevertheless improvements are needed. The fact
that Avaaz is not a specialist NGO compounds the risk of the lack of responsive-
ness to its constituencies.
Avaaz and Active Equitable Inclusion
The only governance structure known for Avaaz is their four-member board as dis-
closed in their tax statements, and a host of unnamed experts and partners. There is
no general assembly, forum or discussion list, and the deﬁnition of membership is
very loose.
The problem of failing to include and empower all interested parties in the
decision-making processes is again not exclusive to Avaaz, but typical of any
group that claims to act on behalf of larger publics. Contacting stakeholders is a
painstaking process that impedes swift campaigns, which explains why many
advocacy groups prefer to partner with similar groups they may know and that
are already on the ground in a region, to the detriment of local groups.
But unlike other activist organisations, including digital NGOs such as the
climate campaign group 350.org, Avaaz does not attempt to decentralise campaign-
ing by sharing the strategies of its successful campaigns or suggesting tools for acti-
vism other than the petition. As Kavada observes, Avaaz’s purpose is “designed as
a form of activism for busy people with few minutes to spare, Avaaz also demands
little commitment from its members and makes it difﬁcult to build a sense of com-
munity”.83 This lack of real empowerment diminishes opportunities for individuals
who are new to activism to take the step to get involved.
80. Ball, op. cit.
81. Poll results for 2014 and 2015, available: <https://secure.avaaz.org/en/poll_results_2014/>; <https://
secure.avaaz.org/en/poll_results_2015/?pv=709&rc=fb> (accessed 20 May 2013).
82. Beutz Land, op. cit., p. 212.
83. Kavada, “Engagement, Bonding, and Identity”, op. cit., p. 52.
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As mentioned earlier, most supporters are from wealthier countries and in the
statistics in the 2016 poll we ﬁnd the overwhelming majority has had a secondary
education, with at least half having completed higher education, pointing to a self-
selection of middle and upper middle class internet users. The combination of the
proﬁles of Avaaz members with the top-down governance style creates opportu-
nity for issues to be biased towards more popular and media-attractive groups.
Avaaz and Social Legitimacy
Although it was not possible in the scope of this research to interviewAvaaz’s stake-
holders, there is reasonable evidence to cast a considerable shadow over the demo-
cratic quality ofAvaaz’s practices.Avaazderives its legitimacy from its claim that it is
member-funded and member-driven, acting on behalf of over 40 million individ-
uals, but in the absence of documented member input (and considerable evidence
that Avaaz follows its own agenda), and in the face of less transparent practices as
revealed previously, this legitimacy is called into serious question.
For social legitimacy to be claimed, there would need to be proof that the people
impacted by the decisions that are called into question have at a minimum been
consulted and at best participated in the decision-making process. In previous sec-
tions it has already been established that decision-making is the exclusive purview
of Avaaz’s executive team, although campaign ideas are tested on samples of sub-
scribers. Where there are consultations, these are closed-ended, one-way, and there
is no direct link between member preferences and the issues Avaaz ultimately cam-
paigns on. This is the same complaint that has exasperated promoters of meaning-
ful public participation: even when citizens are consulted, there is no evidence their
views had an impact on the ﬁnal decisions. Avaaz has not improved these short-
comings of public participation. Only a few online advocacy organisations have
in fact ﬂirted with deeper participation,84 among them MoveOn, which soon
decided to abandon the idea, 38 Degrees, which has experimented with two-step
polls, and 350.org, which continues to experiment with training local organisers.
There is no information on how Avaaz obtains mandates to operate on behalf of
citizens in remote countries, only an indication that they occasionally partner with
other NGOs on the ground, and evidence that in some cases they take over local
campaigns.
Avaaz may be creating its own legitimacy, by using the power of numbers, well-
tailored discourse and the speed the internet provides, to spread messages rapidly
through online social networks before facts can be duly considered. Despite its
rhetoric of “member-driven” actions, Avaaz clearly sees itself as leader of the
revolt (see Responsiveness). The belief in a top-down approach is also patent in
the Guardian interview,85 where campaign director Alice Jay actually dismisses
grassroots activism as ineffective.
Lastly, Avaaz has shown that it is not afraid to meddle in foreign policy. It has
been criticised for its militarist stance on Libya and Syria,86 and for interfering in
84. See, for example, Chadwick and Dennis, op. cit.
85. Ball, op. cit.
86. See, for example, JohnHilary, “Internet Activists Should Be CarefulWhat TheyWish for in Libya”,
The Guardian, 10 March 2011, available: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/10/
internet-activists-libya-no-ﬂy-zone> (accessed 15 June 2013).
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the sovereignty of Bolivia with an aggressive political campaign directed at the
indigenous president Evo Morales.87
Avaaz and Deliberation
Deliberation as a tool to improveboth theprocesses of decision-making aswell as the
quality of democratic practices has beenwell studied. Inspired bya republican virtue
view of democracy, deliberation implies effective communication between all inter-
ested parties rather than bargaining or pooling interests. As shown in this article,
Avaaz has no mechanism for discussion or debate with or among its members.
Neither the issues and causes nor the campaigns or results, let alone the process
leading to results, are up for discussion. There is no online forum, nor are there
local or international meetings. Even though supporters can leave comments on
Avaaz’s socialmedia sites, the design of these pagesmaintains the one-to-many com-
munication form and permits Avaaz to highlight their own comments and eliminate
supporters’ comments, limiting the interaction to reaction.Kavada concluded earlier
that Avaaz’s communication model is strictly institutional, with member contri-
butions managed so that they stay small, easy and frequent and all communication
coordinated centrally byAvaaz.88 This control over communication and suppression
of debate increases the risk of elite group bias and the polarisation of views.
This is another democratic deﬁcit that is not exclusive to Avaaz, and relates to the
balance between allowing supporters to grow and learn as activists and the need to
mobilise large numbers in short periods of time. However, other advocacy organ-
isations have experimented with ways to deepen participation, for example by
creating local groups and offering them training and tools. More research might
reveal how deliberation fares in these experiments.
Avaaz and Reﬂexivity
Reﬂexivity is an attitude of self-awareness that helps avoid the pitfalls of consensus
and path dependency. In Avaaz’s modus operandi, there are no indications of self-
inquiry or self-confrontation. On the contrary, the numerous ofﬁcial replies to
critics (even on relatively unknown blogs) tend to show a lack of humility and a
defensive attitude. When Avaaz replies to critics, its spokespersons seem almost
exasperated by the criticism and invariably justify Avaaz’s actions circularly, by
referring to its own actions.89 A case in point is their standard response to the accu-
sation of promoting “clicktivism”,90 which returns the question, asking whether
Gandhi could be accused of “walkavism” or Rosa Parks of “sitavism”. The fact
that Avaaz does not publish a record of its activities and only promotes its latest
87. Federico Fuentes, “Bolivia: NGOsWrong on Morales and Amazon”, Green Left Weekly (September
2011), available: <https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/48950> (accessed 16 June 2013). Avaaz’s campaign:
<https://secure.avaaz.org/en/bolivia_stop_the_crackdown/?pv=31&rc=fb> (accessed 16 June 2013).
88. Anastasia Kavada, “Collective Action and the Social Web: Comparing the Architecture of Avaa-
z.org and Openesf.net”, in Communicative Approaches to Politics and Ethics in Europe: The Intellectual
Work of the 2009 Ecrea European Media And Communication Doctoral Summer School (Tartu, Estonia:
Tartu University Press, 2009), pp. 129–140.
89. Comment on John Hilary’s article, “Internet Activists Should Be Careful What They Wish for in
Libya”, op. cit., available: <https://proﬁle.theguardian.com/user/id/4501715> (accessed 15 June 2013).
90. Ball, op. cit.
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campaigns and a list of victories, with less successful campaigns disappearing from
the site, emphasises its ﬁrm control over its discursive version of the global democ-
racy exercise.
Avaaz winks at reﬂexivity through a small section on their site called Commit-
ment to Accuracy, where it lists some of the “misrepresentations” they may have
given, none of which are damaging. It would be useful to compare Avaaz’s lack
of reﬂexivity to that of similar organisations and of traditional NGOs and
perhaps supranational agencies. Although Avaaz is particularly defensive, most
organisations do not manage reﬂexivity well. After all, criticism and admissions
of failure may damage the image of unity and competence the organisation has
worked hard to build.
Avaaz and Cognitive Justice
For an organisation or group to practise cognitive justice, they need to allow for
different views, like local and traditional knowledge, to be part of the debate on
certain issues. Avaaz’s one-to-many communication style, its formula for creating
impact, which relies on exploring what they call “crisistunity” and on as many
quantiﬁable factors as possible, their use of unnamed experts to justify claims,
and the shallowness of the information provided for decision-making, point to
an elite control over knowledge. Avaaz’s core team and its advisors decide what
knowledge is valid, how to frame the problems, solutions and priorities, and
what version of facts to present. Avaaz’s messages urge followers to act in
seconds, long before the full message and implications have registered, basically
offering two choices: to be on the side of the “good” or to shamefully let “bad”
and “evil” walk the earth.91 All issues, even those exclusively involving foreign
states, are presented through the Avaaz lens, with no voice given to local
groups. Finally, Avaaz has no qualms about operating in foreign nations, with its
own campaigners speaking to politicians and themedia, and its adverts inﬂuencing
public opinion.
Conclusion
The search for a global democracy model in a world coping with enormous social
and environmental challenges, many of which are felt to be the result of global
economic and political dynamics, has inspired a version of mass mobilisation via
the internet. The organisations channelling these mobilisations went from
unknown a decade ago to having become an unavoidable part of the changing pol-
itical landscape. The sway that they hold over global public opinion and the place
they have managed to command in traditional media, added to the speed at which
they are growing their memberships, merits a closer look at their democratic
claims.
In contrast to professional activist NGOs and grassroots movements, which
usually develop in a speciﬁc location, rallying around a common cause and
91. Avaaz’s ad for the 2012 Rio Summit was the object of criticism for its implicit racism: <http://www.
agriculturesnetwork.org/what-we-do/advocacy/rio-20/rio-20/friday-22-june-2012-rio-20-summit-ﬁnal-
day/image/image_view_fullscreen> (accessed 28 September 2016).
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growing country by country, forming new groups that identify with the cause,
advocacy organisations like Avaaz are launched on the internet, grow their mem-
bership virtually and crowdsource their funding. They are unburdened by the
internal politics of traditional movement development, having been thought up
by a new breed of well-connected “movement development” professionals, and
promoted as an instant global brand at almost zero marginal cost.
Despite their shallow version of participation, these organisations can be cred-
ited with exposing considerably more individuals to issues of human rights and
other important social and ecological challenges. Avaaz has managed to create
the largest ever virtual community, joining people from almost all countries in
the world. Online movements should therefore not be dismissed out of hand.
The weak ties that link people in and between networks have long been considered
essential for broader mobilisation. These movements make up in speed and reach
of communication what they lack in substance.
But there are some serious risks to democratic quality associated with this model
of politics. The corporate branding style of framing issues may work to depoliticise
mobilisation. Poignant issues run the risk of becoming the “meme” of the day,
quickly forgotten as another issue takes its place. Multi-issue, menu-style activism
may also destabilise the position and reputation of established NGOs and social
movements, as well as potentially undermining local groups. As Gerbaudo
warns, the populist and centralising tendencies of mass politics exclude minority
views, masking the views of one group as that of all people (“we are the 99%”),
a tendency he calls techno-plebiscitarianism.92 He argues that this is reinforced
by the existence of an invisible, and therefore unaccountable leadership that
spurs supporters to vote on issues that have already been pre-decided. Finally, in
his view, the ambition of online movements to build a new political process
through social media is not matched by attempts to present substantive
demands to improve social and economic conditions, thus reducing the whole
direct democracy exercise to little more than “techno-proceduralism”.
It is not easy to strike a balance between deep participation and large-scale
mobilisation. Established NGOs struggle with this dilemma as much as the new
digital movements, and both may be faulted for excluding other voices for the
sake of a united voice. Democracy is often considered to be a process, and as
such, it should not be the end, but the means with which to achieve goals of
equity. For civil society organisations and movements to contribute meaningfully
to the exercise of social and environmental justice, they need to develop the
strong ties that help deepen knowledge, participation and social learning. This
means they need to embrace democratic values such as transparency, responsibility
and deliberation, in order to avoid the pitfalls of group bias, and improve their
social legitimacy by empowering their members, allowing for more people to par-
ticipate meaningfully in politics.
The analysis of Avaaz’s practices revealed a failure to comply with what are con-
sidered basic democratic attributes. In particular, Avaaz showed a serious lack of
transparency and accountability by not publishing information that would allow
an assessment of their activities and by eliminating less successful campaigns
from their site. There was also a marked lack of responsiveness to their members,
even though as funders the latter may be considered de facto shareholders of the
92. Gerbaudo, op. cit.
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organisation. Evidence pointed to the possibility of dominant interest groups con-
trolling the agenda at Avaaz, undermining guarantees of equality and freedom.
Avaaz was also tested for deeper democratic attributes, where, unsurprisingly, it
fared worse. The organisation provides no mechanism for deliberation, allowing
members only to vote or react. The limited options for participation afforded to
members and the dominance of particular interest groups may block minority
views and interests, as well as limiting and polarising the issues campaigned on.
The same restrictions also undermine Avaaz’s main claim to legitimacy: that it
speaks for its members, who are the real “bosses”. By voting on pre-decided priori-
ties, members are leaving Avaaz in ﬁrm control of the agenda, the message and the
results.
Considering that there are alternative movements for participants who wish to
engage more, are Avaaz’s opaque practices a problem worth considering? The
author argues that they are: the inﬂuence that Avaaz can exercise on public
opinion, its capacity to inﬁltrate traditional media and the sheer numbers it
places behind its messages, compounded by its ﬁnancial resources and the fact
that it does not shy away from interfering in foreign policy, all demands more scru-
tiny of its democratic practices. The Avaaz case revealed problematic democratic
deﬁcits in an organisation that has the attention of millions of internet users and
that has built the capacity to rapidly inﬁltrate its message into the media and
business sectors.
This research aimed to contribute to creating a model for critically assessing the
democratic quality of the practices of political actors, focused in particular on, but
not limited to, the organisations behind digital mass politics. Further research
could reﬁne the tools of the current, more exploratory assessment and look into
different aspects of online public participation, such as the proﬁle and motivations
of the participants and to what extent certain democratic practices affect them, and
the similarities or differences in democratic practices between traditional NGOs,
digital NGOs and more spontaneous movements like Occupy.
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